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Abstract
Background: Although evidence has suggested that computerized drug-drug interaction alert systems may reduce
the occurrence of drug-drug interactions, the numerous reminders and alerts generated by such systems could
represent an excessive burden for clinicians, resulting in a high override rate of not only unimportant, but also
important alerts.
Methods: We analyzed physicians’ responses to alerts of relative contraindications and contraindications for
coadministration in a computerized drug-drug interaction alert system at Hokkaido University Hospital. In this
system, the physician must enter a password to override an alert and continue an order. All of the drug-drug
interaction alerts generated between December 2011 and November 2012 at Hokkaido University Hospital were
included in this study.
Results: The system generated a total of 170 alerts of relative contraindications and contraindication for coadministration;
59 (34.7 %) of the corresponding orders were cancelled after the alert was accepted, and 111 (65.3 %) were overridden.
The most frequent contraindication alert was for the combination of 3-hydroxy-3-methylglutaryl–coenzyme A reductase
inhibitors and fibrates. No incidents involving drug-drug interactions were reported among patients who were prescribed
contraindicated drug pairs after an override.
Conclusions: Although computerized drug-drug interaction alert systems that require password overrides appear useful
for promoting medication safety, having to enter passwords to override alerts may represent an excessive burden for the
prescribing physician. Therefore, both patient safety and physicians’ workloads should be taken into consideration in
future designs of computerized drug-drug interaction alert systems.
Keywords: Adverse drug event, Alert fatigue, Computerized drug-drug interaction alert system, Contraindications for
coadministration
Background
Numerous widespread patient safety issues were identi-
fied in a report published by the Institute of Medicine in
2000 entitled “To Err is Human” [1]. Many other reports
have shown that among all medical incidents that occur
in hospitals, drug-related incidents are the most preva-
lent [2–4]. Gandhi et al. reported that 25 % of the outpa-
tients at four adult primary care practices experienced
adverse drug events (ADEs) in ambulatory care; 13 % of
these events were serious, 28 % were ameliorable, and
11 % were preventable [5]. Unlike ADEs, which are often
unpredictable, drug-drug interactions (DDIs) can be
avoided if physicians take extra precautions when pre-
scribing medications. Although evidence has shown that
a computerized DDI alert system (DIAS) could reduce
the incidence of DDIs [6–10], the burden of numerous
reminders and alerts may cause clinicians to override
not only unimportant, but also important alerts [8, 11].
Some recent studies concluded that over-alerting and a
lack of practical management or recommendations
often cause physicians to disregard even serious alerts
[12–14]. One review article concluded that between
49 % and 96 % of computerized DDI alerts are routinely
ignored or overridden [15]. This “alert fatigue” strongly
* Correspondence: nasuhara@med.hokudai.ac.jp
1Division of Hospital Safety Management, Hokkaido University Hospital,
Sapporo, Japan
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© 2015 Nasuhara et al. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Nasuhara et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2015) 15:74 
DOI 10.1186/s12911-015-0194-y
limits the applicability of automated alerts. A systematic
review showed that conditions such as low specificity,
low sensitivity, and unclear information content may
make the alert system prone to errors that result in ac-
tive failures of the physician, such as ignoring import-
ant alerts, misinterpretation, and incorrect handling
[15]. With the goal of reducing alert fatigue, a number
of studies have attempted to identify and rate key DDIs
[16, 17]. Findings from these studies suggest that physi-
cians typically override alerts for the following three
reasons: prior awareness of the DDI; insufficient know-
ledge of the DDI; or carelessness.
The DIAS at Hokkaido University Hospital has a very
unique function in that when an alert of contraindica-
tions for coadministration is triggered, the physician
must contact the hospital pharmacist to obtain a pass-
word; these passwords are randomly generated and
changed daily. Next, to complete the order, the physician
must enter the password along with a reason for the
override. Therefore, physicians can override alerts only
after considering the associated DDIs. To our know-
ledge, this is the first study to investigate override rates
among physicians with awareness of DDIs using a DIAS
that requires a password override.
To clarify physicians’ responses, we examined all
DDI alerts generated for one year at Hokkaido Univer-
sity Hospital. In addition, to utilize more homogenized
subjects, we examined only alerts generated due to
relative contraindications and contraindications for co-
administration as described in drug package inserts.
We also examined the profiles of DDIs with respect to
drug types and the presence or absence of incidents in-
volving DDIs.
Methods
Drug-drug interaction database at Hokkaido University
Hospital
The DDI database at Hokkaido University Hospital was
developed by the institution’s pharmacy department. In
Japan, drug package inserts must include the following
information in relation to DDIs: 1) possible DDIs with
other drugs have been considered; 2) the drug should
not be coadministered with other drugs because serious
DDIs may occur (relative contraindications for coadmin-
istration); and 3) coadministration of the drug with other
drugs is prohibited due to the high prevalence of serious
DDIs (contraindications for coadministration). The latter
two points were manually entered into the computerized
DIAS by the pharmacy department. Drug pairs in which
contraindications were listed in the package insert of
one drug but not the other were also included. The data-
base was updated as new drugs were approved and drug
package inserts were revised.
Order entry system at Hokkaido University Hospital
The DIAS at our hospital was originally developed by the
Division of Medical Information Planning at Hokkaido
University Hospital in collaboration with NEC (Nippon
Denki). A computerized DIAS programmed with .NET and
Visual Basic was incorporated into the existing order entry
system. When a DDI is detected through cross-checking
prescriptions with the DDI database, a pop-up alert win-
dow, as shown in Fig. 1 (in Japanese), is displayed in real
time. An alert is triggered upon occurrence of any of the
following situations: interactions with prescriptions or-
dered during the same visit; interactions with prescriptions
ordered by different physicians; or interactions with previ-
ous prescriptions that are still active. In the case of relative
contraindications and contraindications for coadministra-
tion, a “Contraindication!” message, accompanied by the
reason for the alert, is displayed on the screen. If the phys-
ician wishes to override the alert and continue the order,
they must first enter a password. To obtain the password,
which is randomly generated and changed daily, they have
to contact the hospital pharmacists. To proceed with the
order, physicians must also enter the reason for overriding
the alert by clicking corresponding buttons displayed on
the monitor; these reasons include a long interval to avoid
DDI, an expected DDI, an emergency situation in which
the order is necessary, and planned use of a modified dos-
age to avoid the DDI. A flow chart of the computerized
DIAS used at our hospital is shown in Fig. 2.
Data collection and analysis
Hokkaido University Hospital is a national university
hospital in Japan with 936 beds, about 3,000 outpatients/
Fig. 1 The pop-up window displayed on the screen in real time
when an alert of relative contraindications and contraindications for
coadministration is generated. A “Contraindication!” message is
displayed on the screen along with the reason for the alert. The
protocol for requesting a password is also shown
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day, about 550 doctors, and an average of 37,500 pre-
scriptions/month. All drugs prescribed at our hospital
are ordered through the computerized order entry sys-
tem and recorded in the database; all DDI alerts trig-
gered by the system are also recorded. All DDI alerts
triggered by the computerized DIAS for prescriptions
from Hokkaido University Hospital between December
2011 and November 2012 were included in this study
(268,622 prescriptions for the study period). A database
specialist (RU) from the Division of Medical Information
Planning extracted and compiled the necessary data into
a spreadsheet for analysis by two experienced (KN and
YN). In April 2012 and August 2014, medical records
were reviewed (YN) for the presence or absence of in-
cidents involving DDIs in patients prescribed contrain-
dicated drug pairs.
Ethics
This study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board of Hokkaido University Hospital.
Results
For one year from December 2011 to November 2012,
1449 alerts for contraindicated coadministration were
recorded in the system log (Fig. 3). Among these alerts,
some were generated for the same patient and the same
drug pairs ordered by the same physician on the same
day. Physicians had two typical response patterns when
making repeated attempts to reorder the prescription.
The first response primarily involved physicians who
were unfamiliar with the DIAS. These physicians thought
that they could override DDI alerts simply by clicking the
“cancel” button. Once discovering that their order had
Fig. 2 A flow chart showing the computerized drug-drug interaction alert system used at Hokkaido University Hospital
Fig. 3 The number of alerts of the coadministration for contraindicated
drug pairs generated in this study. Alerts are categorized according to
the reasons described in the figure
Nasuhara et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2015) 15:74 Page 3 of 6
actually been cancelled, they would reorder the drugs and
contact the hospital pharmacist to obtain a password. The
other common response by physicians was to purposefully
cancel their order when a DDI alert was triggered. Then,
after careful consideration, they would then reorder the
same pair of contraindicated drugs and contact the
pharmacist to obtain a password. When these types of re-
peated alerts were counted as single alerts, the number of
alerts for the study period dropped from 1449 to 531. In
addition, some patients visited the hospital several times
during the study period. Therefore, alerts generated for
the same drug pair for the same patient by the same
physician were also counted as single alerts; this further
reduced the number of alerts generated during the
study period to 170.
In response to these 170 alerts, 59 (34.7 %) of the cor-
responding orders were cancelled due to alert accept-
ance, and 111 (65.3 %) were prescribed after a password
override (Fig. 3). Drug pairs for which physicians over-
rode DDI alerts more than five times are listed in
Table 1. The most frequent contraindication alert was
for the combination of HMG-CoA (3-hydroxy-3-methyl-
glutaryl–coenzyme A) reductase inhibitors and fibrates,
followed by tacrolimus hydrate and potassium-sparing
diuretics. No incidents due to these combinations were
recorded in the patients’ medical records up to 28 months
after the prescriptions were issued. Drug combinations
that were cancelled more than twice due to alert accept-
ance are listed in Table 2.
Discussion
In the present study, the overall alert override rate was
65.3 %, which is compatible with override rates reported
in previous studies between 49 % and 96 % [15]. One
study reported an overall acceptance rate of only 8.5 %;
however, most of the alerts were overridden (91.5 %).
Regarding the recognition of DDIs in that study, physi-
cians were aware of 82.0 % of the DDIs, were unaware
of 15.9 %, and ignored 2.1 % of the alerts [18]. The
present study has three important differences from pre-
vious studies. First, in order to override alerts, physicians
had to contact pharmacists to obtain passwords, which
were randomly assigned and changed daily. When physi-
cians see alerts on the screen, they may intentionally or
unintentionally ignore them and click the “continue” or
“ignore” button. In the computerized DIAS in our hos-
pital, the password system prevents physicians from pre-
scribing contraindicated drug pairs carelessly. Therefore,
physicians who overrode alerts and prescribed all 111
contraindicated drug pairs were aware of the contraindi-
cations. Second, we only analyzed alerts generated due
to relative contraindications and contraindications for
coadministration as described in drug package inserts.
Third, because physicians had to consult with pharma-
cists directly to obtain override passwords, physicians
could only decide to continue with their orders after
receiving detailed pharmaceutical reasons for the con-
traindications. The present study therefore revealed
that even under such conditions, physicians still over-
ride DDI alerts at a high rate. Furthermore, no ADEs
related to DDIs were reported among patients who
were prescribed contraindicated drug pairs after an
alert override.
On the other hand, 34.7 % of all contraindicated orders
were cancelled due to DDI alerts. In these cases, the phys-
ician may have cancelled the order because they were un-
aware of the contraindication before the alert. They then
could have decided that the contraindicated drugs were
not absolutely necessary and prescribed alternative medi-
cations. The cancelled drug pairs were not only low-risk
pairs such as albumin tannate and ferrous fumarate, but
also high-risk pairs such as voriconazole and triazolam
(Table 2). As a result, it is also possible that alerts help
prevent incidents involving DDIs. Therefore, we conclude
that a computerized DIAS that requires password over-
rides for coadministration of contraindicated drugs is
useful for promoting medication safety.
This study did have several limitations. First, we only
performed quantitative analysis. In the DIAS at our hos-
pital, physicians choose the reason for overriding an alert
Table 1 Drug pairs for which physicians overrode drug-drug
interaction alerts more than five times
Drug pairs Orders
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors Fibrates 35
Tacrolimus hydrate Potassium-sparing diuretics 15
Triptans Triptansa 8
Immunosuppressants Immunosuppressants 7
Albumin tannate Ferrous fumarate 7
Potassium-sparing diuretics Potassium-sparing diuretics
Potassium chloride 6
aCoadministration of tablet and nasal inhalation or injection included
Table 2 Drug combinations cancelled due to alert acceptance
Drug pairs Orders
Albumin tannate Ferrous fumarate 10
HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors Fibrates 8
Miconazole Calcium channel blockers 5
Voriconazole Triazolam 4
Triptans Triptansa 4
Selegiline hydrochloride SSRIb 3
Potassium-sparing diuretics Potassium-sparing diuretics
Potassium chloride 3
Combinations that were cancelled more than twice are listed
aCoadministration of tablet and nasal inhalation or injection included
bSSRI: selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor
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by clicking corresponding buttons displayed on the moni-
tor; these reasons include a long interval to avoid DDI, an
expected DDI, an emergency situation in which the order
is necessary, planned use of a modified dosage to avoid the
DDI, and others. To understand the behavior of physicians,
it is important to analyze the frequency of selection for
each reason; however, in this study, nearly all of the reasons
were “others”, which may indicate negligence on the part
of the physician. Therefore, we could not perform an ana-
lysis regarding the reasons for alert overrides; such an ana-
lysis should be performed in a future study. Second,
detailed information about physicians, such as their clinical
experience or whether they were generalists or specialists,
was not obtained in this study. The influence of back-
ground characteristics and experience on physicians’ be-
haviors in response to alerts should be investigated in a
future study. It would also be important to analyze physi-
cians’ behaviors after obtaining detailed explanations from
pharmacists. The DIAS recorded all instances in which
passwords were issued, but not consultations between phy-
sicians and pharmacists; therefore, when physicians
attempted to override alerts, we could not distinguish
whether they had obtained detailed pharmaceutical expla-
nations before cancelling the order. It would also be useful
to obtain physicians’ voices regarding systems that require
password overrides to continue an order and how such
systems affect their workflow.
In a recent report, contraindicated combinations based
on drug package inserts were prescribed for just 0.2 % of
over 400,000 patients in a Japanese database of health in-
surance claims [19]. The most frequently contraindicated
drug combinations in that study involved lipid-regulating
drugs, anti-migraine drugs, drugs that included metal
irons, antifungals, macrolides, and immunosuppressants.
Therefore, the result of our study may be generalized in
point of the sort of prescribed contraindicated coadminis-
tration pairs at least in Japan. Furthermore, unlike the
study involving patients in the Japanese database of health
insurance claims, our study investigated the presence or
absence of incidents involving DDIs.
These results suggest that physicians’ workloads should
be considered in future computerized DIAS designs. One
method of reducing alert fatigue may be to temporarily
deactivate alerts for the same contraindicated drug pairs
prescribed to the same patient by the same physician that
have been overridden. The results of this study shed light
on possible strategies for developing a more efficient
DIAS.
Conclusions
In this study, we explored the behavior of physicians
only in regard to orders requiring password overrides
for the coadministration of contraindicated drug pairs in
a DIAS at Hokkaido University Hospital in Japan. Based
on our results and those from previous studies, a com-
puterized DIAS with password overrides is useful for
promoting medication safety. However, the password
override system may represent an excessive burden for
physicians and thereby increase alert fatigue. Even
though physicians who were aware of contraindicated
drug pairs still overrode DDI alerts at a high rate, no
incidents involving DDIs were reported among patients
who were prescribed contraindicated drug pairs after
an override. On the other hand, 34.7 % of the contrain-
dicated orders were cancelled due to alert acceptance.
Therefore, both patient safety and physicians’ work-
loads should be considered in future computerized
DIAS designs.
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